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Abstract 
 
In the following paper I will examine the possibility of a rational 
foundation of morals, rational in the sense that to ground a moral statement on 
reason amounts to being able to convince an unmotivated agent to conform to a 
moral rule - that is to say, to “rationally motivate” him (as Habermas would have 
said) to act in ways for which he or she had no previous reason to act. We will 
scrutinize the “internalist’s” objection (in Williams’ definition) to such a claim 
and confront it with a, however, obvious fact: our need to convince or, at least, 
to influence agents to act according to moral judgements that entail strong 
validity claims. Therefore we need to find a better ground for our moral norms 
than that provided by a narrow concept of practical reason, which ultimately 
offers the basis for the internalist’s intuitions. 
Classical philosophers believed that to have a “right” sense meant also to 
think accordingly, that there was no intelligence without a social or moral side 
and that a person who lacked moral sense was not, at the same time, very 
intelligent. This contradicts some deep Humean intuitions, and in any case 
requires a more complex concept of practical reason than the one we normally 
encounter in internalist moral philosophers. In the following pages, I would like 
to reflect on this kind of social reason, or intelligence, or moral rationality, in an 
attempt to couple, in a coherent vision of moral sense within the framework of 
practical reason, intuitions that appear in Kant and Adam Smith with empirical 
research about what the lack of moral sense could mean.   
                                                 
* For helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft, I am most grateful to Monica Betzler, Thomas 
Wallgren, Rebecca Beke and Mark Gregson. 
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Introduction 
 
Moral judgments seem to imply a strong truth or validity claim. When we 
say "an action is morally wrong", the predicate ‘wrong’ refers here to something 
about which we would not want to make any concessions. In ordinary language, 
such judgements are normally understood as strict demands. They are not like 
the suggestions of rational agents of the type "I would not cut carrots with this 
knife if I were you", nor are they simple expressions of intense personal feelings 
or dislikes. 
 When we say that "to torture people or sentient beings for the pleasure of 
seeing them suffer is morally wrong", the point is not that we do not like it or 
that we may try to understand those who do such things. Rather, we feel that 
no-one is allowed to torture other beings, and that everybody should be 
acquainted with the feelings of repulsion that these actions arouse in those who 
endorse the norm sincerely. It would be odd if someone asked for explanations 
when we forbade them to molest children or abuse or humiliate people. This 
strong normativity is the distinct mark of moral judgments, precisely what 
distinguishes them from mere conventions and other imperatives. It obliges in a 
way that bears no resemblance to other kinds of practical recommendations, 
particularly in modern societies.  
This powerful normativity suggests that there are good arguments for the 
strong feelings of obligation associated with a moral norm. However, is it 
possible to find such convincing grounds in modern societies? This proves difficult 
within a realistic or objectivistic framework, since a rational agent may very well 
derive satisfaction from despicable attitudes. It is an undisputed fact that people 
can be, and throughout the ages have been, delighted by things that appear to us 
almost unspeakable, such as the kind of pleasure experienced by Roman citizens 
in their public games. On the other hand, if we shift our perspective and try to 
look for the sources of this strong normativity inside our subjective nature, we 
run the risk of diluting it into mere psychology: the moral attitude would merely 
be the remnants of an earlier socialization process that took place within a moral 
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community. In consequence, no strong validity claim could be implied here and 
no rational agreement among equals could ever be justified. 
 In the following pages I will examine one of the attempts that has been 
made to find a solid basis for our moral imperatives - the rational foundation (the 
others are based on religion or tradition). It is important to bear in mind the 
Habermasian definition of rational foundation, in the sense of his concept of 
communicative action, in order to fully understand the scope of this attempt. 
According to this definition, to ground a moral statement on reason amounts to 
being able to convince an unmotivated agent to conform to a moral rule - that is 
to say, to rationally motivate him to act in ways in which he had no reason to act 
previously. However, we will see that, according to the internalist, this type of 
rational motivation is, by definition, impossible within the conceptual framework 
of a standard theory of rational choice, for to do something in this sense means 
simply doing what we want or prefer. This explains why the attempts to ground 
the strong validity claim of moral judgments on the standard or narrow concept 
of rational choice have not yielded many encouraging results. 
 No doubt we would all be happy with this situation if it were not for the 
powerful validity claim that accompanies moral judgments. We need to convince 
unmotivated agents because we do not want to be their victims and we do not 
want our loved ones to be their victims. A world where we cannot show the truth 
of our strong moral convictions, such as not torturing people or animals, does not 
seem to be right. This is why the internalist contention of moral motivation is so 
unsatisfactory in the end. We need to find a better ground for our moral norms 
than that provided by a narrow concept of practical reason. Furthermore, we 
would like to be sure that we are not deceiving ourselves when we state that 
moral norms are followed, not because we are afraid of feelings of inner 
sanction, nor because we are simply unable to abuse or despise sentient beings, 
but because it is correct or right to abide by the moral imperatives in the way we 
do.  
 It seems, then, that we need to reflect seriously on the possibility of 
grounding morals on reason. Classical philosophers believed that to “feel” well, 
 4 
i.e. to have a “correct” sensibility, meant also to think well, that there was no 
intelligence without a social or moral side and that a person who lacks moral 
sense cannot be, at the same time, very intelligent. This contradicts some deep 
Humean intuitions, and in any case requires a more complex concept of practical 
reason than the one we normally encounter in internalist moral philosophers. 
Therefore I would like to reflect on this kind of moral reason, or intelligence, in 
order to find a link between intuitions concerning the nature of practical reason 
with empirical research about what the lack of moral sense could mean.  
For to simply postulate a wider concept of practical reason or rational 
deliberation on practical judgments would not be enough. To say that the moral 
stance supposes not only the right affective attitude but also that this attitude 
might result from, or might complement, reflective or rational powers of the sort 
that are not normally associated with a healthy moral character is an empirical 
hypothesis. I will also, therefore, present some empirical evidence concerning 
the lack of moral sense, and I will use this to support the need to construct a 
better concept of practical reason. Thus the philosophical analysis of the concept 
of a moral rationality aims fundamentally at suggesting to the moral psychologist 
and to the neuroscientist a possible direction for empirical research.1  
 
I. 
 
It has been said that modern moral discourse is mainly characterised by 
the aspiration to find a rational foundation for morals. It explores the possibility 
of social norms and received traditional obligations being firmly grounded in 
rational argument. Its aim has been to replace old traditional views with 
arguments based on universally accepted traits about human nature and the good 
of people, which for the universalist should be evident to everyone. However, for 
those of us who are continually horrified by the amount of abuse and crime 
imposed on people by some who do not seem to share with us a common notion 
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of human decency, defining the meaning and perspectives of a rational 
foundation for morals has become increasingly challenging and problematic. 
Unavoidable ambiguities in the concepts of practical reason, motivation, 
validity or truth, even in the meaning of moral obligation and constraint, have 
diluted the once noble aspiration to create a space for the transparent discussion 
of practical norms and to reach a final agreement based on arguments accepted 
by everyone. Instead, two different ways of eluding the whole task and 
abandoning its aims have emerged. The first consists of divorcing reason from 
motivation and makes the latter dependent on affective features that are 
supposed to be unrelated to the reflective and rational powers of the human 
mind.  The second attacks the notion of reason as such, engulfing it in motivation 
and thereby surrendering all attempts to reach a rational agreement on practical 
issues. This allows the agent to abandon himself to irrationality, to mere force or 
to changing moods that are perceived as not needing justification.          
It is also difficult to figure out what it means to produce a rational 
foundation for morals. Those who believe in the “rational motivation”2 of an 
interlocutor think it is possible to find rational criteria for the assessment of the 
truth-value of a practical judgement, as well as criteria for making sense of 
someone else’s actions. In contrast, from the point of view of the relativist, it is 
not only impossible to share rational criteria for the assessment of action 
judgements, but to be rational has an entirely different meaning: it merely 
conveys the private interests or preferences of an agent and thus contains 
nothing that could be shared on an inter-subjective ground. In Hume’s terms3 
rational choice does not refer to the ends of an action, but only to the means we 
                                                 
1 As analysis of basic concepts, the philosophical task is precisely to provide the theorist with possible means 
for a critical and constructive exploration of an object domain. See, for instance, P.F. Strawson, 1992, 
Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press. 
2 For instance, Jürgen Habermas. The fact that, for Habermas, the foundation of moral norms links 
normativity (Normativität) and rationality through the notion of communicative understanding processes 
(rational motivierende Verständigungsprozesse) that may rationally motivate a previously unmotivated 
interlocutor is crucial to his concept of practical reason. See, for instance, his Theorie des kommunikativen 
Handelns, Introduction, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1981, his Erläuterung zur Diskursethik, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1991, or his Faktizität und Geltung, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1998. The 
German phrase I quote here appears in this last book, p.20. I have extensively analysed this aspect of 
Habermas's thought in my El lenguaje de la modernidad, Monte Ávila Latinoamericana, Caracas, 1994. 
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decide to employ in order to achieve what we want. Therefore, if someone wants 
to incur some form of self-sacrifice in order to follow moral duty, it would not 
make much sense to call their action “irrational” as long as they do what they 
consider they want to do, after sufficient personal deliberation. 
According to a narrow, standard theory of rational choice, a rational agent 
follows personal preferences that need not be universally accepted. These 
preferences or ends are supposed to be stable and, since they are assessed by 
economic theory, there is no common measure to compare the diverse utilities 
deriving from their fulfilment. This is bad news for the universalist because it 
makes a rational agreement on motives or preferences - in the case of moral 
actions - impossible. Although such actions seem valid in an inter-subjective 
sense for the agent who endorses them sincerely, a narrow concept of practical 
reason makes the universality of moral respect towards others implausible. 
Let us examine why. We are indebted to Bernard Williams and his 
conception of moral internalism for a short and precise description of the 
problem at hand. Because he identifies motives for actions with reasons, as must 
be the case within the standard or narrow theory of rational choice, he denies 
the possibility of persuading or of rationally motivating an interlocutor to act 
according to a moral norm in the absence of a pre-existing “internal” motivation 
to do so. For if I do not have a motive to enrol in the army, nor will I have a 
reason to do so, and therefore no amount of “rational discussion” will persuade 
me to do something for which I have no reason. In contrast, the opposite 
conception, which Williams calls “externalism”, stresses that it is possible to 
convince an unmotivated interlocutor to follow a moral prescription if one can 
show that it is in the interlocutor’s best interest to conform to the rule, even if 
he is not previously motivated to do so. In this case, a moral norm will be true or 
valid (so states the philosophical tradition) if it is “rational” in this “external” 
sense. The recommendation would be a reason not in the internal, private way, 
                                                 
3 See David Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 416.  
 7 
but in a way that is susceptible of inter-subjective agreement.4 In this sense, 
reasons are not motives, but good reasons for every possible agent.  
According to the rational theorist or, as Williams calls him, the externalist 
theorist, a practical prescription (or a moral norm) is true if and only if it is 
always in your best interest to comply with it, even if you do not want to do it - 
that is, even if you do not find now, in your particular system of motives, a 
reason to comply with it. We clearly have here two interpretations of what it 
means to be “rational”. On the one hand, we have an objective or externalist 
point of view, and on the other, a narrow conception of reason, where the 
rationality of an action depends on the requirements it serves. These are agent-
centred: the value of a certain action rests on what the agent considers valuable 
or good for him. 
 This idea of reason is very persuasive. The notion of rationality normally 
refers only to what satisfies an agent’s preferences. Therefore, the value of an 
action is relative to the agent’s set of interests, preferences or motives. The 
problem is that such a conception of reason is at odds with that special feature 
of moral action we pointed out before: its apparent universalist character. As a 
consequence, the internalist theorist is forced to justify the validity claim of an 
obligation without resorting to reason, understood as the capacity to offer 
universalist criteria leading to inter-subjective agreement about the good of an 
action. This being the case, the foundation of a moral attitude is not sought in 
the rational arena but somewhere else, most probably in the psychology of the 
moral agent, since we need to explain empirically why a particular person does 
not seem to share with other moral agents what we consider relevant 
motivations. This could explain why the internalist theorist regards moral 
motivation as something affective and discards cognitive aspects that could be 
the object of rational agreement within an argumentative discussion aiming at 
some sort of theoretical truth. And this could also explain why we tend to 
separate the idea of a “genuine” moral motivation from a “rational”, self-
                                                 
4 See Bernard Williams, “Internal and External Reasons” in Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press, 1980. 
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centred motivation.  It is our narrow conception of practical reason that justifies 
the emphasis we put on being in possession of a moral sense as a condition for a 
rational agreement on moral norms. 
Exiled from the philosophical discussion about the nature of a foundation 
for morals, the theory of rational choice is abandoned by moral philosophy in 
favour of a reflection centred on the nature of moral duty and, ultimately, on 
moral personality, where to be a moral person would merely refer to the 
capacity to experience moral feelings. Like Hume, the internalist also thinks that 
a moral person is not more reflective than others or more open to rational 
deliberation, but has a better or more “temperate” character.5   
However, in the last few decades, several lines of argument have been 
explored in order to expand the standard theory of rational choice to a less 
"irrational" - that is, closer to a universalist idea of the sources constituting the 
validity of a moral norm - notion of moral motivation. Or, to put it another way, 
in order to reconcile these opposing views concerning the normative content of a 
moral rule, so that we could have a weaker notion of the rationality of an action, 
expressing motives and ends which an interpreter can reconstruct, and a stronger 
one, where we demand from the agent certain motives and ends towards other 
living beings. The normative content we expect from a moral action is therefore 
much stronger than the content we expect from a morally neutral action, such as 
which flavour of ice cream I will ask for next, for nobody would mind if I were to 
choose vanilla instead of chocolate but they would find it strange if I asked for a 
steak-flavoured ice cream.6        
                                                 
5 Hume, op. cit., p. 417 and 418. Also Bernard Williams's conclusions in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 
Fontana Press, 1985 and Simon Blackburn's remarks in his Ruling Passions, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998: 
"The differences between the wanton and a member of the party of mankind are distinctions within the brood 
of dispositions, and have nothing to do with the authoritative exercise of the moral law, nor with the true 
operation of autonomy" (p. 251). 
6 The idea that there is an implicit normative assumption when we assess actions has also received special 
attention in Simon Blackburn, 1998. But his notion refers to a weaker sense of what it means to conform to a 
normative structure. In Blackburn’s sense, in order to be intelligible an action must reflect at least some of the 
wide range of practical norms. However, the moral demand is not an expectation of intelligibility in this 
sense, but a strong demand to conform to what we expect from a moral person. We do not only want to 
understand a moral agent, but demand from him certain attitudes, and therefore some strong values.   
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The standard theory of rational choice, which is a narrow version of 
rationality since it does not prejudge the universal validity (or truth) of the ends 
and preferences at issue, works well under conditions of certainty - that is, when 
the agent knows what payments or utilities to expect from specific actions; or 
within a parametric framework, when the agent does not have to face other 
people’s decisions or does not have to lessen the impact of other actions on his 
eventual benefits. Things become complicated when the payments or utilities 
that you expect are or can be affected by other agents’ actions. There are 
several models of strategic interaction that specify which are the most rational 
strategies for someone who has to interact with other “players”. The results can 
be assessed either from the point of view of the strategies themselves or from 
the point of view of their expected utilities. From the point of view of the 
strategies, a result is a Nash equilibrium if the strategy maximises its value, that 
is, if it is the best strategy, given the strategies of other players. From the point 
of view of the payments or utilities, a strategy yields optimal results (or is a 
Pareto's optimum) if it maximises the utility of the agent given the expected 
utilities of other players. The ideal situation is when the strategies in equilibrium 
produce optimal results. However, there is a game where this coincidence does 
not take place: the Prisoner's Dilemma. Here we have only two strategies: either 
to defeat the opposite party or to cooperate with them. A Nash equilibrium is 
possible when all parties decide to defeat the counterpart. However, the optimal 
payment results not from defection or fraud but from cooperation. Hence the 
dilemma: we have here a conflict between the best strategy and the best result. 
Or, in simpler words, the best rational strategy yields the worst results for the 
rational agent, whereas the best one is the most “irrational”.7 
 There is another way to show the same point and this is the one that 
inspires Rawls and other contractualist social theorists. The main idea is that the 
rational agent wants the best results he can attain given the outcomes of others. 
But, as happens in Prisoner's Dilemma, the best strategy seems to be to exploit 
                                                 
7 For extended discussion see Gutiérrez, Gilberto, Ética y decisión racional, Editorial Síntesis, Madrid, 2000, 
p.131 ff.  
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the cooperative dispositions of others. The problem is that if everybody took a 
free-rider attitude, exploiting others for their own benefit, this would be worse 
for everybody. In the social contract, for instance, if everybody behaved as in 
the state of nature, they would all lose the better outcomes that result from 
cooperation, as well as the possibility of fulfilling their own conception of the 
good without being interfered with by others. Here we have a coordination 
problem that could only be solved if those implicated in the social contract gave 
up some of their freedom in order to better fulfil their ends, providing that other 
agents did the same. In Rawls's model, this strategy gives rise to two principles of 
justice that allow all agents to reasonably pursue their particular rational plans 
of life without being obstructed by those of other people. Thus the same idea 
applies to the Prisoner's Dilemma as to the social contract: if someone has to 
interact several times with the same individuals, it is better to avoid the 
unbridled pursuit of their own satisfaction in order to enhance the chances for 
mutually beneficial cooperation.       
Even under this interpretation, however, the contractualist model turns 
out to be unsatisfactory as a complete theory of moral motivation. For, even if 
you know that you have to interact several times with your partners within a 
contract, there is no straightforward argument that favours the abandoning of 
the relative advantages you may have as a rational agent. These relative 
advantages do make a difference regarding your position within a society ruled 
by a social contract. Of course, you may say that a society that applies social 
rules differentially is less efficient.  Or “unfair”, as they may hinder you from 
following your personal conception of the good. Given the uncertainty of human 
affairs, by which you may or may not enjoy your personal advantages over a long 
period of time, it seems advisable to prefer principles of distributive justice that 
ignore your personal assets or have been founded “under a veil of ignorance”. 
But if you happen to know which are your personal advantages and have a 
reasonable expectation about how long you will probably enjoy them, it does not 
seem rational to avoid using them when faced with a good opportunity.        
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In fact, the role that this abandoning of advantages plays in a supposedly 
rational theory of the moral attitude is still unclear. This is why Rawls's critics 
claim that you would only agree to ignore your personal assets in favour of a 
general rule of distributive justice if you already had some kind of pre-existing 
moral motivation to do so. Perhaps, if you did not know what your relative 
advantages were, you would prefer to abide by a general or fair rule. But since 
we normally do know, it is impossible to show why someone who does not 
already have an internal motivation would prefer to favour a general conception 
of the good rather than their own. 
 An interesting instance of a position that reconciles both options, an 
internalist with a rational foundation, is David Gauthier’s theory of a rational 
moral.8  Gauthier’s initial idea is that, as we have already pointed out, Rawls's 
foundation of principles of justice cannot legitimately be called “rational”, for it 
has been reached only after an agent has ignored his personal assets or relative 
advantages regarding other agents. In Gauthier’s view, your acquiescence to the 
conditions of the contract - and your acceptance of the outcomes of the 
argumentation process which has taken place under conditions analogous to the 
original position - has to be the result of a genuinely rational strategy. 
Furthermore, the principles of justice, as well as moral norms, need to be 
considered in the light of a rational strategy which should be accepted, as Rawls 
suggested, as part of a theory of rational choice.  None of these conditions apply 
if, on the one hand, you are already prepared to consider - from the beginning, 
and as a potential member of a situation similar to the original position - your 
personal interest within the framework of a general rule; and if, on the other 
hand, you are also prepared to abide by the conditions produced by the contract 
even when - once the veil of ignorance is removed – you are endowed with 
personal advantages.    
 The intuition here is that no rational person will ever be willing to 
consider the personal interest of other agents as important as her own interest. 
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As we have already pointed out, rationality means to regard value as agent-
centred. To suppose that a rational agent might be willing to comply with rules 
that apply to all rational agents in the same measure is another way of saying 
that there are some “objective” values, in contrast to value created by a 
personal and subjective set of preferences and motivations. Therefore, 
Gauthier’s challenge is to deepen the rational character of the contract by 
removing all conditions that would suggest other motives for complying with the 
rules produced by it, different from the rational pursuit of each person’s own 
interest. This is why Gauthier regards a moral system as a rational strategy.    
There are, in principle, two ways of deriving cooperation from a theory of 
rational decision. The first depends on the well-known argument concerning 
interactions that extend through time: given more than one possible interaction, 
a rational agent will try to build up trust among the parties so he can guarantee 
their future cooperation and, therefore, the fulfilment of his long-term personal 
interest.     
The second  - Gauthier’s argument - is more subtle. According to Gauthier, 
even if you have to interact only once with a group of potential co-operators, 
you will lose the opportunity of reaching an optimum personal outcome if you do 
not give up your selfish, exploitative stance, in favour of a cooperative one.9 
Thus this is not simply a question of the reputation you may attain if you do not 
defeat others, but of realising that if the others are prepared to cooperate - that 
is, if you expect others to cooperate with you and if you know they are capable 
of identifying your willingness to cooperate - then you will achieve a better 
outcome from this conditional cooperation than if you abstain from cooperating 
by taking a selfish stance, for you would be expelled from the contract and 
therefore you would lose the potential gains that can only be obtained among a 
community of co-operators. The next step is to show that cooperation can be the 
                                                 
8 See Gauthier, David, 1998: Egoísmo, moralidad y sociedad liberal, Paidós. See also his Morals by 
Agreement, Oxford University Press, 1986. 
9 Gauthier, D., “El egoísta incompleto” (“The Incomplete Egoist”), in Gauthier, 1998.  Originally published in 
the Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Vol. 5, University of Utah Press and Cambridge University Press, 
1984.  
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best rational strategy for agents preoccupied only with their own interest. Or, as 
Gauthier has stated, that rational selfishness, confronted with the chances of 
gain offered by cooperation and mutual trust, is inconsistent and self-defeating.  
  
But the willingness to cooperate with and trust others requires you to have 
a personal stance that lasts over the years. In other words, it requires you to 
have some particular psychological traits. At this point you may distinguish moral 
motivation from rational motivation by insisting that being a person with a moral 
character (that is, being a person with genuine moral motives in your subjective 
motivational set) is different from merely acting on the mandate of a reasonable 
recommendation. For if you were this kind of person, you would not be tempted 
to break the agreements reached with others (and, furthermore, you would also 
want to reach an agreement and cooperate with others, thus avoiding the perils 
for your own welfare brought about by rational self-interest).  Or you may, as 
Gauthier does, try to couple the convenience of being a moral person with a 
rational prescription by suggesting that reason commits you to developing a long-
term moral attitude. Gauthier’s solution to the dilemma posed to reciprocal 
cooperation by a rational attitude (where rational means only to maximise your 
own conception of the good - that is to say, to maximise the benefits resulting 
from the satisfaction of your personal values and preferences) entails showing 
that a rational person may well try to avoid the self-defeating aspects of a selfish 
frame of mind by acknowledging that she would better serve her personal 
interest through cooperation with others.   
However, Gauthier’s argument has the following flaw: he points out that if 
a rational agent knew that others would cooperate with him and if they knew 
that he was a potential co-operator, then he would prefer to cooperate in order 
to increase his benefits. But this argument cannot be derived from situations 
resembling the Prisoner’s Dilemma: in fact, the rational thing to do for someone 
who is playing games of this sort, or faces similar situations in real life, is to 
exploit the other person if he knows with certainty that the other will cooperate. 
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Of course, you may say that someone who has to interact several times with 
another person needs to build up trust, but again, this kind of temporal argument 
was the one Gauthier was precisely trying to avoid, since he wanted to show that 
it is a better strategy to cooperate with potential co-operators even if you have 
to do it just once.    
There is only one situation, if we really follow the lesson resulting from 
playing Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which you would cooperate and in which this 
would be a rational action: this is when you do not know what the other person 
has chosen or will choose, because once you know what she has chosen - that is 
to say, once you know that the other has either confessed or not confessed, or 
cooperated or not cooperated - your rational action in either case must be (if you 
have to interact once and only once with this person) not to cooperate.     
In consequence, Gauthier’s argument must be: cooperate when you do not 
know what the others have done. If you, by chance, land in a collective situation 
where you find yourself having to interact with others who you have not seen 
before and will never see again, cooperate: you may well find yourself in the 
kind of interaction where, if you refuse to cooperate with others, you will miss 
the optimum outcome (as in Prisoner’s Dilemma).     
But having to cooperate in uncertain situations - that is, when you do not 
know how others' decisions will affect your benefits – implies precisely that you 
already have a subjective moral motivation. What rationality, then, is advising 
you to do, since having a selfish attitude can be self-defeating, is to BE a moral 
person. Reason seems here to recommend having a sort of cooperative 
disposition, a genuine moral motivation in what Williams called one's subjective 
motivational set.  This is how Gauthier ended up endorsing the internalist point 
of view, when he was trying to argue in favour of the opposite, externalist 
position.     
So, if you find yourself in the sort of situation where you do not know what 
others have done or will do, it could be psychologically impossible for you to 
pretend to be a trustworthy co-operator if you are not already this kind of 
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person. And if you are not, you won't be able to make sincere promises to other 
people so that they can really trust you in the future, in which case you will 
reduce your chances of promoting your personal well-being. But, on the other 
hand, if you are able to promise to cooperate sincerely, then you are the kind of 
moral person who did not need a rational argument to begin with.     
II.  
In the rest of this paper, I will explore two aspects of Kant’s concept of 
practical reason that might contribute to a better understanding of what it 
means to be a truly rational person. In doing so, however, I will leave aside the 
most metaphysical features of Kant’s notion of autonomy. My aim is rather to 
highlight the capacity for self-reflection and the sense of being restricted by 
moral law that seem to be implied by the notion of a rational agent - if we 
understand him as an empirical and not noumenal self - and to make the 
resulting image of a rational agent plausible through empirical data concerning 
the lack of moral sense.  
Kant's notion of practical reason has frequently been used to support the 
case for a rational foundation for moral imperatives. Kant believed that, as a 
practical rule, to be grounded on reason meant to pass a universality criterion, in 
very much the same way that a statement referring to an objective state of 
affairs needs to awaken some kind of general agreement to be considered true. 
But for Kant the universality of a scientific statement did not float in the air but 
rather rested on the unity of understanding and perception - that is, on common 
features belonging to the human cognitive framework. It is this unity of the 
transcendental subject that supports the consent around a given assertion about 
a state of affairs. This is why the model of a moral norm is the categorical 
imperative. However, while it is clear that, for a given objective statement, pure 
reason offers the necessary cognitive framework that sustains the truth claim of 
synthetic judgements, where is the truth claim to be grounded in the case of 
practical rules? Is there a common framework, shared by all “rational beings”, as 
Kant often said, which would guarantee the unity of criteria needed by a 
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practical rule in order to be considered universal, or which could ground a 
presumed universality claim concerning practical rules?      
If a practical rule is to command the same kind of unanimous consent that 
characterises statements resulting from the formal or natural sciences, it has, 
above all, to override my personal tastes or dislikes with its persuasive force. 
Rational autonomy means, for Kant, that the human will knows itself to be 
restricted by a sense of duty. It is only through the internalised moral rule that a 
rational agent realises his condition as a genuinely free agent - that is to say, 
genuinely free to restrict himself, to abstain, from doing what he wants when he 
knows what he must do. It is only through the feeling of being utterly restricted 
by duty that the rational agent discovers the freedom of his will as an absolute 
framework within which the validity of a norm expresses itself. This kind of 
freedom is for the philosopher a reverse image, an unending possibility for the 
agent who wants to assume it entirely. As such, the autonomy that the moral 
rule uncovers does not show itself completely; it appears before him not as a 
blank page, but like a territory one needs to explore. It reveals all its potential 
only as the agent finds himself to be limited and restricted by the moral rule. 
Then he discovers that he is free to follow or not what is demanded of him by his 
sense of duty. 10  
This is the reason why a moral norm, which has the characteristic of 
revealing my freedom not just to do what I want, cannot be considered a means 
to a personal end. And, therefore, the usual contractualist argument only finds a 
secondary place within the Kantian system. Kant was keenly aware of the 
objections that would have to be faced by a foundation for morals based on an 
agent-centred notion of value. In contrast, what he had in mind was a practical 
rule whose universality was capable of overriding my personal wants or 
preferences, making me respect others' feelings and preferences even if they 
collided with mine, and which would express the feeling of being strongly 
restricted by moral law.  
                                                 
10 See Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, A 53, p. 139. 
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The Kantian notion of freedom of will, which begins with the awareness of 
the restrictions imposed on us by moral law, is very interesting, for it depicts a 
persuasive image of rational freedom as such - that is to say, detached from its 
roots in morality. According to economic thought, for instance, to be a rational 
agent means always to incur opportunity costs: each course of action has a price 
insofar as it deflects scarce resources (in particular, valuable time) that could 
have been invested in alternative courses of action. This is the so-called Law of 
Diminishing Marginal Utility, a basic assumption about human attribution of 
value: the more one has of a good, the less an economic agent will value 
additional units of it, for with each new unit the opportunity costs increase.11 
C.K. Chesterton, in some memorable pages, sheds light on the same aspect of 
the freedom of will - that which is discovered and experienced in the face of our 
limitations, moral or mundane. Every intentional action implies a sacrifice 
willingly made. Moreover, for Chesterton, as well as for the economists, every 
act of evaluation implies a sense of the limited means we have to enjoy life. A 
rational agent who thought he could have it all, with no restriction, would not 
simply be “selfish”, he would be wrong from an ontological point of view. This 
sort of agent does not exist. As Chesterton convincingly showed, the notion of a 
rational agent, as an individual dominated by the will for power, is a 
metaphysical invention.12 
A moral norm, according to Kant, has a universal validity claim that should 
be grounded on reason, like an assertion emerging from natural sciences. Kant's 
notion of practical reason offered us the possibility of finding not only a rule that 
meets the criteria of universality required by a moral norm (the categorical 
imperative), but also the common ground whose features, shared by all rational 
beings or, as we would say now, by humankind, would guarantee the agreement 
that supports the practical rule. Modern contractualists, as we have already 
seen, have also tried to find a rational foundation for morals stemming from an 
                                                 
11 See, for instance, Lionel Robbins, “The Nature and Significance of Economic Science”, in Daniel Hausman 
(Ed.), 1994, The Philosophy of economics, Cambridge University Press.  
12 Cfr. C.K. Chesterton, 2000, Ortodoxia, Editorial Alta Fulla, Barcelona. 
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agent-centred notion of value. We have also already seen the limits of these 
attempts. However, Kant's idea, which I think is worth considering, is that the 
concept of an agent-centred notion of value implies analytically some features of 
rational agency that would support the case for a moral consideration of rational 
beings, and would not imply, as Kant intended, a straightforward reference to 
moral feelings or personal inclination unrelated to the regular, rational and self-
centred pursuit of happiness.     
This idea states that rational nature is characterised by the fact that it has 
to choose. At the same time, the objective limitations that force us to choose 
offer the framework for all rational attribution of value, despite the fact that 
there are many different kinds of consideration determining the criteria for the 
process of choosing (in Kant’s case the restrictions are basically moral - an 
internalised moral law). But the basic fact is this: we have to choose amidst 
restrictions imposed sometimes by objective circumstances, sometimes by a 
moral law, and at other times simply by other choosers. To be a rational agent 
means, ideally, that we decide for ourselves our ends and choose what we 
consider most valuable among several alternative courses of action. To be 
rational, then, points to the fairly obvious fact that we usually decide what we 
would like to do and how we are going to do it. Of course, not everybody enjoys 
this sort of autonomy - we will come back to this in a minute - but, in general, to 
be rational is to value something that we, as rational beings, consider valuable. 
Hence the problem of those who despair of trying to ground morals on reason, 
since different rational agents value things differently depending on their 
personal preferences.    
Kant was aware that from the mere fact of our condition of rational agents 
with personal ends it does not follow that we should respect everybody's ends to 
the same degree. But Kant knew that once you accepted as satisfactory the 
agent-centred definition of rationality, you also had to acknowledge that the 
crucial aspect of this notion is that a rational agent has chosen or may choose his 
ends with autonomy and that this autonomy implies a sense of limitation. To take 
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this step you only need to define rationality as having chosen certain ends, for 
whatever reason. This is why there is no obligation to respect everybody's ends, 
because what makes them valuable is only that a rational agent values them. To 
put it simply, no end, just because it is someone's end, is valuable in itself, and 
Kant insists on that in several passages of his Groundwork.13      
In consequence, if there is a ground for respecting someone's ends it is not 
because of the ends as such, but because they are a rational agent's ends, the 
ones he has decided he wants and values. Therefore we do not value every end 
but rather an end in itself, which is the ground of every end, that which makes 
an end something valued. This is the core of the third formulation of the 
categorical imperative. But, we may still ask, why should we value above all the 
person who makes attributions of value? I think that what Kant had in mind was a 
twofold idea of the meaning of rational agency. Firstly, that each rational agent, 
and therefore particularly me as a rational agent, cherishes and knows what is to 
have the freedom to make attributions of value. Secondly, that I will value this 
capacity in me and in other rational beings if I am aware of the sense of 
limitation and restriction on other beings that it entails. To be a truly free agent 
inherently involves the gaze of the other upon me. This is why, for Kant, moral 
respect begins with respect towards ourselves, an aspect of moral sense that, by 
the way, has been neglected by modern interpreters of Kant's practical theory.14 
Kant’s idea of practical reason offers, therefore, not merely the form a rule has 
to exhibit to be considered valid for an agent (the categorical imperative), but 
also a concrete idea of what it means to be a rational agent, an idea that is 
implied analytically in our condition of agents, even if we might sometimes make 
wrong choices.      
Now let us explore the meaning of this for the understanding and 
constitution of a moral motivation. Each of us knows what is to value something 
and what is to have access to the means that enable us to reach the goals we 
have striven for. This is what Rawls called in his Theory of Justice the 
                                                 
13 See, for instance, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten BA 68, p. 62, footnote.  
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“Aristotelian motivational principle”, or the view that is contained in Ronald 
Dworkin's “challenge model”, in which having the opportunity to lead the life 
that one values, regardless of the impact an action would add to one's own 
welfare, is what matters. In the challenge model what counts is performance - 
that is to say, to pursue an end for the end itself and not because it would have 
an impact on anyone's life.15     
Dworkin's distinction between a model of impact and a model of 
challenge, whereby the first stresses the potential objective value of a rational 
agent's set of ends and the second a view of human life as a challenge for the 
rational person who wants to do what he thinks is worth doing, casts light on two 
essential, albeit sometimes confusing, aspects of rationality. Let us recall 
Williams's argument against the rational foundation for morals: that there is no 
reason to follow a prescription emanating from someone else's motivational set. 
But it is one thing not to be able to recognise as valid another person's ends and 
another, very different thing, not to be able to identify oneself with the 
enjoyment - that is to say, with the sense of pursuing something that one 
considers important - that comes from simply being a rational agent.   
Now, if we see Kant's rational foundation of morals in the light of 
something analogous to Dworkin's model of challenge or Rawls's Aristotelian 
motivational principle, we can understand why Kant insists on the third 
formulation of the categorical imperative - that you have to treat human beings 
as ends in themselves and not merely as means - in order to find a universal 
support for moral recommendations. What ought to be valued, in Kant's view, is 
the intrinsic value of rational activity as put forward by rational agents and not 
the relative values of single ends. And you will want to do this not simply 
because, as a self-interested agent, you want to be given free rein to pursue 
what you prefer (for this would take us back to the contractualist argument of 
the sort advanced by Gauthier), but because you know that being a rational 
                                                 
14 See Grundlegung, BA 82, p. 71. 
15 See Dworkin, Ronald, 1988, Foundations of Liberal Equality, The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, 
Stanford University Press, University of Utah Press, p. 57.  
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agent actually means that what you essentially value is not merely your single, 
contingent ends but the freedom, the autonomy, you enjoy as such.    
Kant suggests that this conclusion follows from the notion of rationality 
itself. I think we could agree with him in that to be rational also means to be 
reasonable -that is, to be able to reflect about the things we prefer or value and, 
above all, about our condition as agents who make attributions of value. 
Therefore, if we think, as Williams does, that to be rational does not necessarily 
entail respecting other people's prescriptions, it nevertheless implies the 
capacity to turn the attention towards our own condition as agents who want the 
freedom to make attributions of value. But now: can this capacity support a form 
of moral respect towards others? Should I respect others just because I am the 
ground of the things I value?    
The internalist view, and its expressivist interpretation, rejects rational 
foundations for morals on the grounds that our usual notion of rationality 
supposes an exploitative attitude in relation to other agents that cannot be 
reconciled with the selfless stance that characterises morality. But in Kant's 
view, to be rational does not simply entail the willingness to use other things and 
other persons as a means, but rather a capacity to make attributions of value 
within an environment characterised by inner and outer restrictions. Within this 
capacity, we are the highest end, precisely the kind of end that gives its own 
ends their sense of importance, while at the same time conscious that we are 
framed by objective circumstances and other choosers. Now, Kant believed that 
when we see ourselves in this light, we are able to see others in the same way. 
Of course, he could not prove it, as I cannot prove it now, because this is an 
empirical assumption: what it states is that to be rational means to be aware of 
one's own capacity to make attributions of value, and this kind of awareness lets 
us imagine how important it is also for others to have the freedom to choose 
their own ends. With this interpretation, I think we can understand why Kant 
thought that a foundation for morals follows from the concept of rationality. 
Moreover, a subtler exploration of the meaning of being a rational agent might 
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produce a better understanding of the origins of the feelings of mutual sympathy 
that constitute an important aspect of moral motivation. 
It is, however, Adam Smith who postulates imagination as the link that 
leads one subjectivity to recognise itself in another. For Adam Smith, imagination 
and sympathy are two distinct steps in the constitution of a moral sense and the 
former, as in Kant, is an attribution of the rational agency. It emerges initially 
from the gaze we cast on how we would feel under circumstances similar to 
those in which another rational agent might find himself. When we see another's 
grief with sympathy, states Smith, it is not that we abandon or forget ourselves, 
but rather that we return to ourselves to see how we would feel if we were 
them. And the criteria we use to assess our feelings derive from our condition of 
agents that make attributions of value in order to fulfil our conception of the 
good life, for we ask ourselves whether such unfortunate circumstances would 
also make us unhappy or not and to what extent.16 
For the majority of internalist moral philosophers, having been socialised 
within a moral community is a precondition for the sort of reflectivity that 
directs on oneself the attention we might receive from another - the impartial 
spectator. But, even if we may not be so sure about what its origins were, we 
would be well advised to avoid reducing it exclusively to the moral stance. It 
seems to me that, as Smith suggested, our capacity to see ourselves as agents 
that value our happiness is an aspect of rationality itself. It is closely associated 
with the theoretical meaning of truth: that which transcends our mere 
subjectivities. Proper rationality demands the disposition to see ourselves as 
limited, along with other rational beings. 
We have here, then, several properties of rational deliberation that are 
not only inherent to the moral stance, but also constitutive of the kind of 
cognitive independence that makes the assessment of truth-value possible. These 
are: reflectivity, imagination, and the capacity for identification and recognition 
                                                 
16 See Smith, Adam: The Theory of Moral Sentiments in Schneider, Herbert W. (Ed.): Adam Smith's Moral 
and Political Philosophy, Hafner Publishing Company, New York, 1948, p. 81.  
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in another's situation. Normally, when we reflect on moral feelings and moral 
socialisation, we tend to suppose that they force us to subordinate our attention 
and preoccupation about our own goals and interests to those of another sentient 
being. We think moral feelings promote the oblivion of self. This is the reason 
why Hume's knave or the free-rider is normally seen as someone that, while 
lacking moral sense, is however very capable of promoting his or her own 
interest, for we tend to suppose that when someone lacks moral sense, they are 
nevertheless able to take care of themselves as rational agents.17 
A better picture would be to conceive rational deliberation in practical 
issues as a capacity that affects not only my relationship with other agents, but 
also my relationship to my interests, my goals and myself. According to this 
picture, the incapacity to reflect on our condition as rational agents supposes 
also the incapacity to identify ourselves with another agent and imagine 
ourselves in his situation: our condition of rational agents collapses when we are 
unable to consider other people’s interests. Even if this sort of reflectivity is 
conditioned by a previous moral socialisation (so that someone who has not been 
socialised within a moral community would not be capable of rational 
deliberation in this broad sense), the lack of it also affects the capacity of an 
agent to effectively promote his interests and goals and to relate to them in a 
free or autonomous way. In this respect, it would be true, after all, that an 
amoral person is also irrational. 
But now, you may well say this is all very counter-intuitive or even too 
good to be true. You can be a very bad but a very successful person at the same 
time, it might be objected. However, can we really describe these people as 
rational? Is the individual who lacks moral sense really trying rationally to 
promote his own interests and goals? According to the picture I have been trying 
to construct, someone lacking moral sense would not only have difficulties in 
gaining reflexive access to their own system of preferences and motives, which is 
                                                 
17 "But he is not - writes Blackburn about Hume's knave- on the face of it irrational: indeed, to manage his 
knavery effectively he must be intelligent as well as daring. In spite of Kant's dream, it is better then, to rest 
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a condition for rational deliberation, but also in having an accurate image of 
themselves as rational agents.  
Since the conceptual reflection on the nature of practical deliberation has 
led us to an empirical thesis, we will now make it plausible by using what has 
been gained conceptually to illuminate empirical research on this matter.  We 
may try to understand, for instance, how a person lacking moral sense really 
ought to be assessed.  Are there descriptions of this sort of person that match 
our conception of rational agency and moral motivation?   
   Yes, there are. Now let me draw some conclusions for our conception of 
moral motivation from this notion of reflective rationality. The first one is that a 
person lacking moral sense may not really be rational either, as some internalists 
have suggested. Someone who uses others only as a means could, according to 
this semi-Kantian view of rationality, be seeing themselves just as a means for 
ends they cannot really deliberate over. And someone who does not have the 
freedom to reflect about their own ends is not being rational in a proper sense: 
they are not making any real choice but compulsively pursuing the things they 
prefer. This is compatible with some known facts about what we could call 
"amoral" personalities. In my opinion, these kinds of people tend to be either 
sociopaths or, more interestingly, suffer from narcissistic personality disorder.18 
While the former have been seen as the clearer instance of people lacking moral 
sense, the latter dwell unnoticed among us in higher numbers: these are the 
kinds of people with a good sense of reality that nevertheless invariably exploit 
others and make them subservient to their own agenda. The narcissist 
characteristically exemplifies the kind of person who lacks the features we 
normally ascribe to a person with a healthy moral sense. These are the capacity 
to empathise with others, to feel guilt or remorse if another is being hurt by 
                                                 
content with Smith and Hume. The knave is vicious and odious. We have already the words to express our 
contempt: it does not add anything except rhetoric to call him also irrational". Blackburn, 1998, p.223.  
18 My description of the narcissistic personality disorder is based on the landmark work of the Chilean 
American psychiatrist Otto Kernberg. See, in particular, Desórdenes fronterizos y narcisismo patológico, 
Paidós, Barcelona, 1993 and Relaciones amorosas: normalidad y patología, Paidós, Barcelona, 1995. 
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one's own actions and to feel ashamed when excluded from the moral 
community. Narcissists, for reasons I cannot explore in depth now, feel 
themselves so threatened by others, and so overcome with aggressive impulses 
towards people with whom they intend to have intimate relationships, that they 
are not able to integrate feelings of love with their aggressive tendencies into a 
unified image of a person. This trait forces them to end close relationships 
abruptly, since they would be unable to tolerate the impulses of their aggressive 
nature.  
The etiology of narcissism shows not only an impaired process of 
socialisation that makes the narcissist incapable of the moral feelings normally 
associated with having a moral motivation. It is also believed that the strong 
impulses of aggressive nature are directed primarily towards oneself and this 
would explain the need to project them. Therefore, my argument is that the 
impaired capacity to feel empathy towards others supposes also a lack of 
freedom regarding one's own wants and preferences - that is to say, it supposes 
that the narcissist, trapped in a world dominated by ill will, has no other choice 
but to act as if he had to defend himself against a world that conspires to destroy 
him. What I am trying to say is that this characterises not only a personality that 
is not moral, but also very probably (but again, this is speculation, for it is an 
empirical assumption that must be duly tested by the moral psychologist) a flaw 
of a cognitive nature: the inability to relate to oneself as a free rational agent. 
This pleads in favour of a more differentiated view of the role rationality plays in 
the constitution of moral motivation. But, as I have been insisting, we need a 
concept of rationality that includes a better concept of what it means to be a 
rational agent.     
 Adam Smith had an intuition that supports what I am trying to say. It is not 
that a person who lacks moral sense loves himself or herself more than any 
other. It is that they love themselves as badly as they love others. So it seems to 
me that he believed that real love for oneself needs a rational spectator, 
someone who teaches us to love ourselves as others could love us: "As to love our 
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neighbour as we love ourselves is the great law of Christianity - he wrote - so it is 
the great precept of nature to love ourselves only as we love our neighbour, or, 
what comes to the same thing, as our neighbour is capable of loving us."19 
My suggestion would be that a person who can relate to herself as a free 
rational agent - that is to say, who is free to deliberate about her attributions of 
value - could very well empathise with the necessity of freedom that others 
have, in order to also make attributions of value. Although not sufficient, this is 
a necessary condition for moral sense, for it is the first step that makes moral 
respect towards others possible. Perhaps Kant thought it was sufficient, since he 
made it the substance of one of the formulations of the categorical imperative. 
We cannot be as sure as he was about our capacity to treat all people at all times 
as ends in themselves, but I think we can consider that a conception in which to 
be rational also implies to be aware of the importance of being free to choose - 
which by definition has to be universal, as Kant foresaw – is a pretty accurate 
vision of reason.     
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